The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act by Noone, Michael F., Jr.
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
1969 
The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act 
Michael F. Noone Jr. 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael F. Noone Jr., The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 55 A.B.A.J. 259 (1969). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
Federal Medical Care Recovery Act
by Michael F. Noone
Until the passage of the Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act, which
became effective in 1963, the
Federal Government was not able
to recover the expense of medical
services extended to one who was
entitled to those services when the
injury was caused by the negligence
of a third-party tortfeasor. The act
now gives the Government the right
to join in the suit of the injured party
or to proceed on its own. Through
co-operation with the injured parties'
attorneys, the Government has
recouped millions of dollars.
E ARLY ONE MORNING in Febru-ary, 1944, Private John Etsel,
Army of the United States, was struck
by an oil truck as he crossed a Los An-
geles street. He was hospitalized at a
cost (to the United States) of $123.45,
and during the period of his hospitali-
zation the Government continued to
pay his salary, which amounted to
$69.31. His employer, the United States,
sued the owner of the truck, Standard
Oil of California, for these expenses.
This claim, small as it was, ultimately
reached the Supreme Court of the
United States, for it raised fundamen-
tal questions concerning the Govcrn-
ment's relationship to its employees
and grave constitutional issues regard-
ing the impact of state law on cases
heard in federal courts.
In United States v. Standard Oil
Company, 332 U. S. 301 (1947),
the Court rejected the Government's
request that the common law right
of action per quod consortium et
servitilun amisit, which allocated a
cause of action to a master for injury
to his servant, be extended to cover the
United States as an employer. The
Court stated that it could not create a
new basis for suit without some statu-
tory authority. Apparently, a number
of similar suits which were pending
were withdrawn by the Government as
a result of the Standard Oil decision.'
Although the Court gave Congress
the opportunity to fill the statutory
void, no action was taken for some
years. During this period the Veterans
Administration, under its general au-
thority to issue regulations, required
patients to assign their causes of action
for medical treatment to the United
States. There are a number of reported
cases involving this procedure, which
was applied not only to claims involv-
ing tort liability but to workmen's
compensation suits as well.2 The Veter-
ans Administration's collections were
impressive: in fiscal year 1956: 3.1
million dollars; in fiscal year 1957:
2.7 million dollars; in 1958: 2.1 mil-
lion dollars.
Other Government agencies relied
on statutes authorizing the recovery of
certain expenditures. For example, the
Bureau of Employees' Compensation,
Department of Labor, acting under
Sections 26 and 27 of the Federal Em-
ployees' Compensation Act, recovered
medical expenses and disability pay-
ments in excess of 1.5 million dollars in
fiscal years 1958 and 1959. In some in-
stances, however, the recoveries could
not be turned over to the general fund
of the Treasury. 3
But the Government agencies author-
ized to render medical care without
cost to the greatest numbers of benefi-
ciaries-the Department of Defense
and the Public Health Service--had
neither a statutory nor regulatory basis
for asserting such claims. In 1960 the
Comptroller General estimated that
from January 1, 1957, to June 30,
1959, the Department of Defense had
spent 10.5 million dollars a year on
treatment for military personnel in-
1 332 U. S. at 302, note 2.
2. United States v. St. Paul Mercury In-
demnity Company, 238 F. 2d 594 (8th Cir.
1956) : United States v. Harleysville Mutual
Casualty Company, 150 F Supp. 326 (D.
Md. 1957) ; Brauer v. Fhite Concrete Com-
pany, 253 Iowa 1033, 115 N. W. 2d 202
(1962) ; Stafford v. Pabco, 53 N. J. Super.
300, 147 A. 2d 286 (1958); Higley v.
Schlessman, 292 P 2d 411 (Okla. 1956).
3. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 933, au-
thorized assignment of this right to the em-
ployer or his insurer, while the Railroad Un-
employment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 362(o), gave the Railroad Retirement
Board a lien on the employee's recovery from
a third party and required that collections be
returned to the board.
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jured in accidents involving privately
owned vehicles. He estimated that a
significant portion of the cost of this
treatment should have been recovera-
ble by the Government. Not only was
the Government excluded from seeking
reimbursement, but under the collat-
eral source doctrine the serviceman or
his dependent received a windfall since





Congress responded to the Comptrol.
ler General's report by passing the
Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653, which went into
effect on January 1, 1963.5 The act
gives the United States, in circum-
stances creating tort liability on a third
person, an independent cause of action
for the reasonable value of medical
care rendered an injured party who is
authorized to receive medical, surgical
or dental treatment. The Government
may intervene in the injured party's
suit against the third party or may,
after six months from the final day of
treatment, institute a separate suit. The
statute specifically states that no action
taken by the United States can deny
the injured party's claim for his dam-
ages.
The President was authorized to
issue regulations establishing the cost
of medical care and delegating author-
ity to compromise and waive claims,
and he subsequently directed the Di-
rector of the Bureau of the Budget to
establish rates for the reasonable value
of the care and treatment and the At-
torney General to prescribe regulations
to carry out the purposes of the act.6
The program's success can be meas-
ured by the fact that during the first
year of operations (1963) all agencies
reported collections of $259,227.62,
while during 1967 collections of
$4,036,946.75 were reported.
Government agencies' implementa-
tion of the program has been relatively
uniform. Once notified of the potential
third-party claim, the agency inter-
views the injured party or his repre-
sentative, advises him of the Govern-
ment's claim, requests that he or his at.
torney assert the Government's claim
in conjunction with his own and in-
forms him that once payment is re-
ceived, the United States expects to be
reimbursed. Although the United States
cannot pay counsel fees for the attor-
ney's services, the great majority of
plaintiffs' lawyers co-operate in assert.
ing the Government's claim since the
agency promises its co-operation in
producing official records and testi-
mony and allows the attorney complete
control' over settlement negotiations
and litigation. If the injured party or
his attorney rejects the Government's
request, the agency negotiates directly
with the tortfeasor and, if necessary,
refers the claim to the Department of
Justice for suit.
Of course, the statute and imple-
menting regulations have been chal-
lenged on a number of grounds. The
first decision was an administrative
one in which the Comptroller General
held that the Government could not, in
the absence of a judicial finding of lia-
bility, withhold the amount of its claim
from a tortfeasor-employee's wages.
7
The first reported judicial decision,
United States v. Ammons, 242 F. Supp.
461 (N.D. Fla. 1965), arose when the
injured party released the tortfeasor
from liability; the insurer argued that
the release bound the United States.
The United States sued both the tort-
feasor and the injured party, arguing
4. Hudson v Lazarus, 217 F. 2d 344 (D.C.
Cir. 1954) ; Hudson v. United States, 350 U.
S. 856 (1955); Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, 183 F. 2d 548 (4th Cir.
1950) ; Annot., 68 A.L.R. 2d 876 (1959).
5. Legislative history is discussed exten-
sively in Bernzweig, Public Law 87.693: An
Analysis and Interpretation of the Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1256 (1964).
6. Exec. Order No. 11060, 27 Fed. Reg.
10925 (1962). The rates are found at 28 Fed.
Reg. 11516 and 12014 (1963), 29 Fed. Reg.
12483 (1964) and 30 Fed. Reg. 16220
(1965). Currently the rates are $45 a day for
in-patient care and $9 for each out-patient
visit. The Attorney General's regulations are
in 28 C.F.R. 43, as amended by 32 Fed.
Reg. 713 (1967).
7. 44 Comp. GEN. 601 (1965). But see B.
147227, November 2, 1961, and February 19,
1963, and B-158093, January 26, 1966, which
discuss the injured party's obligation to re-
turn these funds to the Government.
8. United States v. Winter, 275 F. Sapp.
895 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States v. Whit.
that its claim had not been released.
When the court dismissed the Govern-
ment's claim against the injured party,
stating that the Government's claim
was solely against the tortfeasor, the
insurer settled with the Government.
The fact that the insurer was not on
notice of the Government's claim at the
time of settlement with the injured
party and receipt of a release from
him has been held not to bar the Gov-
ernment's claim,8 although two district
courts have disagreed.9
It is now established that the Gov-
ernment's rates for treatment cannot be
challenged,'0 although the unnecessary
periods of hospitalization can be ex-
cluded.1'
The United States has a right to in
tervene in the injured party's suit if its
claim is not protected, 2 and it has
argued that since its position is analo-
gous to that of a subrogor or partial
assignor, the injured party has the
right to sue for the full amount of the
claim if the Government consents, the
question of distribution being a matter
exclusively between the United States
and the injured party.
13
A Louisiana court held that under
state law the United States, as a subro-
gee, was the only party who could
bring a suit for its medical expenses.'
4
However, the court noted that the in-
jured party had failed to show author-
ity from the Government to recover his
special damages and the same court
trock, 268 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1967);
United States v. Bartholomew, 266 F. Supp.
213 (W.D. Okla. 1967) ; United States v.
Jones, 264 F. Sapp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1967);
United States v. Guinn, 259 F. Supp. 771 (D.
N.J. 1966).
9. United States v. York, 261 F. Supp. 713
(W.D. Tenn. 1966), rev'd 398 F. 2d 582 (6th
Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Housing Author-
ity of City of Bremerton, 276 F. Supp. 966
(W.D. Wash. 1967).
10. Phillips v. Trame, 252 F. Supp. 948
(E.D. Iii. 1966).
11. Murphy v. Smith, 243 F. Supp. 1006
(E.D. S.C. 1965). But see Plank v. Summers,
205 Md. 598, 109 A. 2d 914 at 916 (1954).
12. Tolliver v. Shumate, 150 S. E. 2d 579
(W. Va. 1966); Phillips v. Trame, supra
note 10; Murphy v. Smith, supra note 11.
13. Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1242 (1945); 46
C.J.S. Insurance § 1209 (194,6); 29A AM.
JuR. Insurance § 1743 (1960),
14. Smith v. Foucha, 172 So. 2d 318 (Ct.
App. La. 1965), writ refused, 247 La. 678,
173 So.'2d 542 (1965).
260 American Bar Association Journal
Federal Medical Care Recovery Act
subsequently recognized that an in-
jured party's attorney may act for the
Government in negotiating a joint set-
tlement' 5 While local law will deter-
mine the issues of legal liability and
contribution, 16 the local statute of limi-
tations has been held not to apply.
17
Shortly after the passage of the act,
it was suggested that the United States
could have a claim under the injured
party's medical payments or uninsured
motorist coveragei' s The response from
the insurance industry was negative.' 9
However, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit subse-
quently decided that the United States
was an insured within the definition of
the typical uninsured motorist clause.
20
The Government has yet to litigate
its right to assert a medical care claim
under the injured party's medical pay-
ments coverage, probably because the
typical medical payment rider requires
that the medical expenses be actually
incurred. However, it has been sug-
gested2l  that American Indemnity
Company v. Olesijuk, 353 S.W. 2d 71
(Tcxas Civ. App. 1961), stands for the
proposition that expense is incurred
when the treatment is rendered at a ci-
vilian medical facility, although the
Government subsequently pays the bills
under the provisions of 10 U.S.C.
§6203. One writer argues that the serv-
iceman's right to free medical care is
part of his pay, that his medical ex-
penses in effect are prepaid, and that
he does incur an expense within the
meaning of the medical payment
rider.
2'
As a subrogee, the United States
finds that its claim is in a sense only as
valid as that of the injured party. On
occasion, claims have been asserted for
medical care rendered to the child or
wife of the serviceman, and insurers
have responded by rejecting the claim
since the serviceman was contributo.
rily negligent. The insurers' argument
is based on the generally accepted rule
of law that a child or wife has no cause
of action for medical expenses, that
cause of action being considered to re-
side with the parent (or husband)
whose contributory negligence, while
not imputable, may preclude recovery
for this item of damages. The Govern-
ment argues that its claim is derived
not from the sponsor (husband-par-
ent) but from the injured party, who
is someone authorized to receive medi-
cal care under the provisions of 42
U.S.C. § 2651, and that even though the
injured party may not have a cause of
action for procedural reasons, the
United States' claim is not impaired.
23
An unpublished decision considered
the obligations of the United States to
waive or compromise its claim. In
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Company v. Alston, the United
States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana was confronted
with four servicemen who bad been in-
jured in an automobile accident.24 The
Government's claim amounted to
$4,573. The defendant's insurer depos-
ited its limited coverage with the court
and requested that the court make dis-
tribution of what was admittedly a sum
insufficient to compensate the injured
parties fully. The Government refused
to exercise its discretionary right to
waive or compromise its claim, and the
court ruled that this was not an abuse
of discretion subject to judicial review.
English cases suggest that the United
States might have a claim for medical
treatment rendered overseas. 23 The
15. Irby v. Government Employees Insur-
ance Company, 175 So. 2d 9 (Ct. App. La.
1965).
16. Cox v. Maddux, 255 F. Supp. 517
(E.D. Ark. 1966).
17. United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp.
976 (N.D. Ill. 1967) ; United States v. Jones,
264 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1967) ; Tolliver v.
Shumate, supra note 12.
18. Bernsweig, supra note 5, at 1267.
19. Groce. Public Law 87-693: The Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act-A Partial Dis-
sent, INs. L. J. 337 (1965).
20. Government Employees Insurance Com-
pany v. United States, 376 F. 2d 836 (4th Cir.
1967).
21. Bailey, Hospital Recovery Claims-
Problems in the Fringe Area, 7 AEJAG L.
Michael F. Noone holds B.S. (1955),
LL.B. (1957) and LL.M. (1962) degrees
from Georgetown University and an
S.J.D. (1965) from George Washing-
ton University. He is a major in the
Air Force and serves as Director of
Civil Law, Headquarters Third Air
Force, South Ruislip, England.
Government's right to assert these
claims has been affirmed by courts in
France, Germany and the Republic of
Togo. Suits are pending in Crete and
Canada, while insurers in other foreign
countries have routinely paid these
claims without resorting to litigation.
The Government's efforts to collect
these claims, wherever they arise,
should afford the taxpayers satisfac-
tion, while the fruits of increased co-
operation between private practitioners
and government lawyers have been
beneficial to both groups.
Rav. 7, 8 (1965).
22. Gotting, Recovery of Medical Expenses
and the Medical Care Recovery Act, 20
JAG J. 75, 77 (December, 1965-January,
1966).
23. Compare United States v. Greene,
supra note 17, with Bemzweig, supra note 5,
at 1263.
24. Civ. No. 11,072 (January 17, 1967).
25. Atorne} General v. Valle-Jones, [1935]
2 K. B. 209, recognized the validity of a per
qood action for loss of a military man's serv-
ice. The common law right of action per
quod consortium et servitiumn amisit has been
traced to Coke's time. See Mary's Case
(1612), 77 Eng. Rep. 895, Annots. 57 A.L.R.
2d 803 (1958) and 70 A.L.R. 2d 475 (1958).
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